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Controlling the International Market in Antiquities:
Reducing the Harm, Preserving the Past
Patty Gerstenblith*
The recent restitution of antiquities from several major American museums
and the trial in Italy of former Getty antiquities curator Marion True and art
dealer Robert Hecht have focused public attention on the illegal trade in looted
antiquities to an extent rarely seen in the past.' The looting of the Iraq Museum
in Baghdad in April 2003 and the even more disastrous large-scale looting of
archaeological sites in southern Iraq since the beginning of the current Gulf War
have brought the devastating effects of the international market in looted
antiquities into even starker relief.2 The looting of archaeological sites and the
dismemberment of ancient monuments are problems that afflict countries as
wealthy as the United States and the United Kingdom and as poor as Mali and
Bolivia. Recent revelations concerning the functioning of the art market and the
acquisition of antiquities with unknown origins now demonstrate that the
looting of archaeological sites is a well-organized big business motivated
primarily by profit.
The looting of archaeological sites creates negative externalities that harm
society. Because the legal regime aims to eliminate societal harms, the law should
force the actor to internalize the costs3 and thereby discourage the negative
Professor, DePaul University College of Law. I want to thank Megan Kossiakoff for her research
assistance.
For general discussions, see Tracy Wilkinson, Ex-Gety Antiquities Curator Appears at Italian Court
Session, LA Times A9 (Nov 17, 2005) (discussing the trial of Getty curator Marion True); Jason
Felch and Ralph Frammolino, Several Museums May Possess Looted Art, LA Times Al 6 (Nov 8,
2005) (discussing the trial of dealer Robert Hecht).
2 For general discussion, see Micah Garen, The War within the War, 57 Archaeology 28, 31 (July-Aug
2004) (discussing site looting in Iraq); Neela Banerjee and Micah Garen, Saving Iraq's Archaeological
Past from Thieves Remains an Uphill Battle, NY Times A16 (Apr 4, 2004) (discussing antiquities
looting in Iraq); Joanne Farchakh, Le Massacre Au Patrimoine Irakienne, Archaeologia 14, 25-29
(July-Aug 2003).
3 Howard Demsetz, Toward a Theog of Property Rights, 57 Am Econ Rev 347 (1967) (presenting the
classic statement of the effects of negative externalities, focusing on costs only in the monetary
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activity. In this Article, the term "cost" indicates any harmful effect imposed on
an individual or on society as a whole. The loss of cultural value is a cost paid by
society. In the field of cultural heritage law, "value" usually indicates the
intangible worth and significance of original contexts and rarely connotes
monetary value.4 This Article addresses the unique aspects of the trade in
antiquities, that is, archaeological objects that have, over time, been buried in the
ground with an associated assemblage of other artifacts, architectural remains,
and natural features. Because of its link to the looting of sites, the trade in
undocumented antiquities raises legal, ethical, and societal concerns
distinguishing it from the trade in other forms of artwork.
In this Article, I will discuss three components. First, I will examine the
harms that the looting of archaeological sites imposes on society. Second, I will
discuss the responses to the problem, particularly in terms of the law that
attempts to regulate this conduct, and some of the characteristics of the current
legal regime and of the market in antiquities that prevent the law from achieving
its full potential for deterrence. Third, this Article will examine and propose
solutions to discourage site looting and encourage preservation of the remains of
the past for the benefit of the future.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE PAST
There are several detrimental consequences of looting. First, the looting of
archaeological sites imposes negative externalities on society by destroying our
ability to fully understand and reconstruct the past. Humans have long been
interested in the material remains of past cultures, and they have often collected
artifacts as political symbols of domination 5 or as a means of enjoying past
artistic accomplishments. The manner in which artifacts are recovered from the
sense). Demsetz uses these concepts to justify the development of a system of private property
rights, reducing transaction costs and thereby eliminating economic inefficiencies. Id at 349.
4 The translation of this type of value into economic terms is difficult. One attempt is codified in
the Cultural Heritage Resource Crimes Sentencing Guideline in which "archaeological value"
must be included in the valuation of a cultural heritage resource for sentencing purposes, 18 USC
Appx § 2B1.5 Application Note 2(A)(i), and is defined as the cost of retrieving the scientific
information from the archaeological resource, from research design to final publication, that was
harmed through commission of the cultural heritage resource crime. See 18 USC Appx § 2B1.5
Application Note 2(C)(i).
The Romans took cultural and religious symbols from the people and nations they conquered as a
way of displaying their victories. One example is the depiction on the Arch of Titus in Rome of
the triumphal parade including the Menorah removed from the Second Temple in Jerusalem, later
destroyed by the Romans in 70 CE. Napoleon brought to Paris artistic and other cultural works
from Europe, particularly Italy, both to flaunt his conquests and to establish Paris as an artistic
center. John Henry Merryman and Albert E. Elsen, Law, Ethics and the VisualArts 1-8 (Kluwer 3d
ed 1998).
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ground only became important after the development of archaeology as a
science, with examples of stratigraphic excavation and recording known as early
as the seventeenth century. Borrowing in large measure from the emerging fields
of Darwinian evolutionary biology and paleontology that rely on the
stratigraphic placement of fossils to reconstruct the chronological evolution of
life forms, a modern understanding of the role of stratigraphic excavation as key
to understanding human cultural evolution developed by the late eighteenth
century.' Archaeology became a truly interdisciplinary field in the middle and
late twentieth century with the adoption of scientific techniques, such as
radiocarbon and thermoluminescence dating7 and more sophisticated methods,
in conjunction with the use of linguistic, philological, art historical, and
anthropological analyses to understand the past.
Controlled scientific excavation of archaeological sites relies on an
understanding of stratigraphy; remains of past cultures are deposited in layers (or
strata), and each stratum represents a particular time period. Stratigraphic
excavation requires that each layer be removed in reverse chronological order
and that the remains be recovered separately by each stratum, with all the
remains of the same period in association with each other. In this way, the
archaeologist can determine the spatial and chronological relationship of all the
remains, and many aspects of past life can be reconstructed including
economics, trade, health, diet, religious ritual and function, burial methods,
family structure, political organization, technology, and literature. Artistic and
utilitarian objects, faunal and floral remains, architectural features, human
remains, and their original contextual relationship to each other are all equally
6 Excavations carried out by such diverse individuals as Thomas Jefferson in the late eighteenth
century and William Pitt Rivers in the nineteenth century laid the groundwork for an
understanding of the importance of stratigraphic excavation. Mortimer Wheeler, Archaeology from
the Earth 25-29, 57-59 (Penguin 1956). In the mid-twentieth century, Sir Mortimer Wheeler and
Dame Kathleen Kenyon, working in India and the Levant, respectively, further demonstrated the
importance of scientific, controlled excavation and the recovery of contemporary material cultural
remains in association with each other in order to reconstruct the past. Id at 20-37; Kathleen M.
Kenyon, Beginning in Archaeology 68-114 (Praeger 1957).
7 Radiocarbon (C-14) dating is a method of measuring the decay of the radioactive isotope of
carbon in once living materials (such as trees or other organic materials). Living organisms absorb
radiocarbon from the atmosphere; when they die they stop taking in C-14. The C-14 decays at a
known rate; radiocarbon dating measures the amount of C-14 remaining in the sample.
Thermoluminescence dating determines when ceramic materials were last fired and is useful for
dating pottery and other fired materials. Thermoluminescence dating has an advantage over
radiocarbon because it can date inorganic materials such as pottery and flint, and it can do so
beyond the 50,000 year limit of C-14 dating. Yorke Rowan and Morag Kersel, Glossary, in Colin
Renfrew and Paul Bahn, Archaeolog: Theories, Methods and Practice (Thames & Hudson 4th ed 2004),
available online at <http://www.thamesandhudsonusa.com/web/archaeology/glossary.html>
(visited Apr 21, 2007).
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essential in achieving an optimal understanding of the past. This full body of
contextualized information is a destructible, nonrenewable cultural resource.
Once it is destroyed, it cannot be regained. The looting of archaeological sites
destroys this knowledge and forever impairs our ability to understand our past
and ourselves.
A second detrimental consequence of looting is the corruption of the
historical record through the introduction of artifacts that may be forgeries. The
willingness of buyers to accept undocumented antiquities permits the
proliferation of forged artifacts on the market. Looted, decontextualized artifacts
provide no information beyond what is intrinsic in their shape and decoration.
Little is known about their find-spot, their age, their original context, and even
their authenticity. Entire categories of ancient artifacts, such as Cycladic
figurines, are represented almost completely by looted examples.8 Because of the
large-scale looting of Cycladic figurines, it is impossible to determine what they
were used for, whether they were primarily grave goods, what their date is, and
from which of the islands in the Aegean they originate.9 It is also impossible to
tell which Cycladic figurines are authentic and which are fake.1° Because
authenticity is determined by comparing newly discovered objects with
previously known exemplars, looted artifacts do not expand our knowledge.
When a new type of archaeological artifact is excavated, it adds to our corpus of
knowledge; when a new type is known only from examples sold on the market,
it is generally rejected as fake. Therefore, while the market is often considered a
source of fake objects that corrupt the historical record, it can do a further
disservice to the historical record by leading to rejection of authentic artifacts.
These points are explained by Chippindale and Gill:
[T]he central intellectual consequence of the contemporary classical
collections... [is] an unwitting and unthinking conservatism. The new
objects and the way they are treated contribute to our consolidated
knowledge insofar as they confirm, reinforce, and strengthen the existing
8 Christopher Chippindale and David W.J. Gill, Cycladic Figures: Art versus Archaeology? in Kathryn W.
Tubb, ed, Anliquities Trade or Betrayed: Legal, Ethical & Conservation Issues 131, 132 (Archetype 1995)
(noting that many Cycladic figures "surface" on the market with no recorded history); David W.J.
Gill and Christopher Chippindale, Material and Intellectual Consequences of Esteem for Cyladic Figures,
97 Am J Archaeology 601 (1993). Cycladic figurines are small stone sculptures found on the
Cycladic islands located in the Aegean Sea and are generally dated to the mid-third millennium
BCE. New excavations being conducted by Colin Renfrew may help to explain many of the
mysteries surrounding these figurines.
9 Chippindale and Gill, Cycladic Figures at 133-34 (cited in note 8).
10 Many rely on connoisseurship, the study of objects based on form, decoration, and other aesthetic
criteria, to determine authenticity. However, connoisseurship cannot reliably determine
authenticity as is demonstrated by the history of several Rembrandt paintings that were originally
accepted as authentic, then considered inauthentic, and recently returned to authentic status.
Kristine Wilton, Deauthenticated Rembrandts Real afterAll, ARTnews 84 (Mar 2006).
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patterns of knowledge. Surfacing without secure information beyond what
is immanent in themselves, the objects are unable to broaden our basis of
knowledge. Interpreted and restored in light of prior expectations, they are
reconciled with what we presently know, but they cannot amend and
improve our present knowledge much, if at all. Where they do in themselves
offer an anomaly or contradiction to established understanding, the ever-
present dangers of overrestoration and falsity kick in; the truly unusual items
that surface remain incomprehensible until their oddity is matched by a find
for which there is a real security of knowledge. At that point, they can take
up their accustomed role of confirming the correcmess of that knowledge."
The development of interdisciplinary methodologies for the study of the
past coincided with the growth of the international art market in the years
following World War II. The controlled excavation of archaeological sites, which
is an inherently slow and painstaking process, inevitably conflicts with the desire
of public and private collectors to have the maximum number of objects
available on the market immediately and with minimal regulation. The
proliferation of interdisciplinary methodologies for studying human history have
reduced the relative importance of art historical analyses and connoisseurship, as
they are now but one among many disciplines that are used in understanding the
past. Furthermore, unlike other commodities, new antiquities cannot be
manufactured to satisfy market demand (unless they are fakes). Therefore, as the
wealth of Western nations increased and the art market grew to keep pace with
the demand from collectors, the looting of archaeological sites to satisfy this
demand became a significant detriment to the study of the past.
Ethnographic studies of looting in many countries demonstrate that looters
loot for the money they earn. Looting activities respond to market demand for
particular types of artifacts, and looting has moved from an occasional,
opportunistic activity to a sophisticated, well-funded, well-organized business,
including the hiring of looters on retainer so that they work full-time for
particular middlemen. 2 While it is obviously important that looting at sites be
Christopher Chippindale and David W.J. Gill, Material Consequences of Contemporay Classical
Collecting, 104 Am J Archaeology 463, 504-05 (2000) (emphasis in original); see also Neil Brodie
and Christina Luke, Conclusion: The Social and Cultural Contexts of Collecting, in Neil Brodie, et al, eds,
Archaeology, Cultural Heritage, and the Antiquities Trade 303, 309-10 (Florida 2006).
12 The contemporary nature of site looting is now documented in such disparate countries as Iraq,
Italy, Israel and the West Bank, Peru, Turkey, and Thailand. See Morag K. Kersel, License to Sell:
The Legal Trade of Antiquities in Israel (2006) (unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of
Cambridge) (on file with author) (discussing Israel and the West Bank); Peter Watson and Cecilia
Todeschini, The Medici Conipiragy: The Illicit Journg of Looted Antiquities, From Italy's Tomb Raiders to
the World's Greatest Museums (Public Affairs 2006) (discussing Italy); Joanne Farchakh, Mesopotamia
Endangered: Witnessing the Loss of History, Lecture at University of California, Berkeley (Feb 7, 2005),
transcript available online at <http://webcast.berkeley.edu/events/details.phpwebcastid=
10048> (visited Apr 21, 2007) (discussing Iraq); Roger Atwood, Stealing History: Tomb Robbers,
Smugglers, and the Looting of the Andent World (St Martin's 2004) (discussing looting in Peru); C.H.
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interdicted, the law in market countries should also impose detrimental
consequences on sellers and purchasers in order to reduce demand and the
incentive to loot archaeological sites.
II. THE MARKET AND THE LAW
A. LEGAL CONTROL OF THE MARKET
Looting imposes costs on society by destroying the original contexts of
archaeological artifacts and impairing our ability to reconstruct and understand
the past. Because looting is motivated by profit, the rate of looting should
respond to the basic economic law of supply and demand. If collectors in the
market nations refuse to buy undocumented artifacts, then incentives for the
looting of artifacts will decrease. The law should therefore impose a cost on
those who contribute directly or indirectly to the looting of sites by punishing
the handling, selling, and buying of looted antiquities. The law in the US, which
is generally regarded as the single largest market for antiquities in the world, may
be examined as an example of a market nation's attempt to control the market in
antiquities.'
3
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, many nations with a rich
archaeological heritage enacted laws vesting ownership of undiscovered artifacts
in themselves. While a free market proponent would view these laws only as
inhibitions on the market, 14 others see these laws as a means of discouraging
looting of sites by denying the finder and subsequent purchasers title to the
artifacts. Despite these debates, US courts have recognized the efficacy of
national ownership laws. In United States v McClain, the Fifth Circuit held that
Mexico's law vested ownership of not-yet-discovered artifacts in Mexico, and
Roosevelt and C. Luke, Looting Lydia: The Destruction of an Archaeological Landscape in Western Turky,
in Brodie, et al, eds, Archaeology, Cultural Heritage, and the Antiquities Trade 173 (cited in note 11)
(discussing Turkey); Rachanie Thosarat, The Destruction of the Cultural Heritage of Thailand and
Cambodia, in Neil Brodie, Jennifer Doole, and Colin Renfrew, eds, Trade in Illicit Antiquities: The
Destruction of the World's ArchaeologicalHeritage 7 (McDonald Inst 2001) (discussing Thailand).
13 The first federal law in the US to address the domestic archaeological heritage was the Antiquities
Act of 1906, 16 USC §§ 431-433n (2000), which vested ownership and control of artifacts found
on federally owned or controlled land in the federal government.
14 While everyone involved in the debates surrounding antiquities decries the looting of
archaeological sites, those who favor a free market in antiquities view national ownership laws as a
particularly problematic form of restraint on the international market. See, for example, John
Henry Merryman, The Free International Movement of Cultural Propery, 31 NYU J Intl L & Pol 1, 4-12
(1998). Both national ownership laws and export controls are a restraint on the free circulation of
antiquities through the market, but national ownership laws constitute a more severe restraint
because antiquities taken in violation of national ownership laws are stolen property in market
nations, as well as in the country of origin.
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that any artifacts removed from Mexico without permission constituted stolen
property.'" The defendants were convicted of violating the National Stolen
Property Act 6 by conspiring to deal in pre-Columbian artifacts owned by
Mexico.'" In United States v Schultz,'8 the Second Circuit adopted the McClain
holding with the conviction of Frederick Schultz, a prominent New York
antiquities dealer and former president of the National Association of Dealers in
Ancient, Oriental, and Primitive Art ("NADAOPA"), 9 for conspiring to deal in
antiquities removed from Egypt in violation of its 1983 national ownership
law.2° In addition to the National Stolen Property Act, the trafficking provisions
of the Archaeological Resources Protection Act can be utilized to prosecute
individuals involved in the interstate or international transport of stolen
archaeological resources, including those taken in violation of a national
15 The defendants' conviction on the substantive counts was reversed because the Fifth Circuit held
that only Mexico's 1972 law was truly a vesting statute. Nonetheless, the defendants' conviction
on the conspiracy count was affirmed. United States v McClain, 593 F2d 658, 671-72 (5th Cir 1979).
16 See National Stolen Property Act, 18 USC §§ 2314-2315 (2000) (prohibiting the interstate or
international movement of stolen property and the receipt, transfer, and possession of stolen
property that has been transported across state or international boundaries, is worth $5,000 or
more, and is known to have been stolen).
17 See United States v McClain, 545 F2d 988, 1004 (5th Cir 1977). McClain was preceded by United
States v Hollinshead, 495 F2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir 1974), which recognized Guatemala's ownership
of its pre-Columbian artifacts.
18 United States v Scbult.,, 333 F3d 393 (2d Cir 2003).
19 NADAOPA has filed amicus briefs in most of the major cultural property cases over the past
thirty years. It also opposed implementation of the UNESCO Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property (1970), 823 UN Treaty Ser 231 ("1970 UNESCO Convention"), the form of the 1995
Unidroit Convention on Stolen and Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (1995), 34 ILM 1322
(1995), and most, if not all, of the bilateral agreements that the US has entered into pursuant to
the Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 USC §§ 2601-13 (2000). For examples of these
objections, see Celestine Bohlen, Old Rarities, New Respect: U.S. Works with Ital, NY Times E5 (Feb
28, 2001); Statement of Position of Concerned Members of the American Cultural Community regarding the
Unidroit Convention on the International Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (May 31,
1995) (copy on file with author); Unidroit Convention on Stolen and Illegally Exported Cultural
Objects (1995), 34 ILM 1322 (1995), available online at <http://www.unidroit.org/english/
conventions/1 995culturalproperty/1 995culturalproperty-e.htm> (visited Apr 21, 2007).
20 Egyptian Law 117, art 6, quoted in Schul.-, 333 F3d at 399-400.
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ownership law.2' The status of foreign national ownership laws is now clearly
established in those circuits with the most robust art markets.
Other legal restraints under US law include the requirement of proper
declaration of value and country of origin for archaeological artifacts, as with all
imported commercial goods.23 Improper declaration can lead to the forfeiture of
the goods and criminal prosecution of the importer if the misstatements were
made knowingly or intentionally. 24 The requirement to declare the proper
country of origin is crucial in determining what laws apply to the importation of
the artifact.
The 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property ("UNESCO Convention") 25 was the first international attempt to
control the market in artworks and cultural objects. It was promulgated in
response to the growth of the market in the 1960s and, in particular, the
dismemberment of ancient monuments and sites to satisfy market demand.26
There are currently 112 State Parties. 7 While the US was the first major market
nation to ratify it,28 most of the other major market nations, including
Switzerland, the UK, France, and Japan, are now also parties.29
21 Archaeological Resources Protection Act, 16 USC § 470ee(c) (2000). Criminal prosecution would
also be available under state statutes prohibiting possession and dealing in stolen property. See
Ricardo A. St. Hilaire, InternationalAniquiies Trafficking: Theft by Another Name, paper presented at
the Feb 26, 2007 meeting of ICOM-CC, Issues in the Conservation of Cultural Heritage, 4-5.
22 Those circuits include the Second Circuit (Schultv, 333 F3d 393), the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits
(McClain, 593 F2d 658), and the Ninth Circuit (United States v Holinshead, 495 F2d 1154 (9th Cir
1974)).
23 18 USC §§ 542, 545 (2000).
24 See United States v An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F3d 131, 136-37 (2d Cir 1999) (holding that the
country of origin of an ancient gold phiale was Sicily, where it was excavated, rather than
Switzerland, as declared by the importer, through which it was transported en route to the US);
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Press Release, Department of Homeland Securiy Returns
Rare Artifacts to the Pakistani Government (an 23, 2007), available at <http://www.ice.gov/
pi/news/newsreleases/articles/070123newark.htm> (visited Apr 21, 2007) (announcing the
restitution of several Buddha statues and other antiquities to Pakistan because their country of
origin was incorrectly stated to be Dubai).
25 1970 UNESCO Convention (cited in note 19).
26 Clemency Chase Coggins, United States Cultural Propery Legislation: Observations of a Combatant, 7 Intl
J Cultural Prop 52, 52-54 (1998).
27 For a list of State Parties, see <http://porta.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=13039&
language=E&order=alpha> (visited Apr 21, 2007).
28 The Senate voted unanimously to accept the UNESCO Convention in 1972, but implementing
legislation was delayed for eleven years due largely to the objections of the art market community
and of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. At the time of acceptance, the US stated one
understanding and six reservations. Patrick J. O'Keefe, Commentary on the UNESCO 1970
Convention on Illicit Traffic 106-12 (Inst of Art and Law 2000); see generally Barbara B. Rosecrance,
Vol. 8 No. 1
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In 1983, the US enacted the Convention on Cultural Property
Implementation Act ("CPIA"), 30 implementing two sections, article 7(b) and
article 9, of the UNESCO Convention. The CPIA prohibits the importation into
the US of stolen cultural property that had been documented in the inventory of
a museum, religious or secular public institution in another State Party.3' The
CPIA also grants the President the authority, pursuant to a request from a State
Party, to impose import restrictions on designated categories of archaeological
and ethnological materials that are subject to pillage in that State Party.32 The
CPIA provides only for civil forfeiture of the cultural materials at stake and has
no criminal penalties.
33
In addition to criminal prosecution and forfeiture actions that the
government can take, the original owner (typically a foreign government) can
bring a replevin claim in US court to recover its stolen property. Basing its right
to ownership on the national vesting laws recognized in the McClain and Schultz
decisions, a foreign nation can recover antiquities looted and removed without
permission after the effective date of its national ownership law. Many such
successful claims have been brought, including Turkey's recovery of the 360
objects in the Lydian hoard from the Metropolitan Museum of Art 34 and its
recovery of the Elmali coin hoard from private collectors. 35 The recent successes
of Italy and Greece in recovering artifacts from the Metropolitan Museum, the
Boston Museum of Fine Arts, and the Getty Museum were also based on these
nations' ability to recover stolen artifacts in actions for replevin.36
Harmonious Meeting: The McClain Decision and the Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 Cornell Intl
LJ 311 (1986).
29 Id. For a more detailed discussion of the British and Swiss implementing legislation, see Patty
Gerstenblith, From Bamyan to Baghdad: Warfare and the Protection of Cultural Heritage at the Beginning of
the 21 t Century, 37 Geo J Intl L 245, 332-34 (2006).
30 19 USC §2601-13 (2000).
31 19 USC § 2607 (2000). The definition of "cultural property" tracks that given in Article 1 of the
UNESCO Convention and is very broad. 19 USC § 2601(6) (2000).
32 19 USC §§ 2602-03 (2000). For a more detailed discussion of the CPIA process, see Gerstenblith,
37 Geo J Intl L at 319-24 (cited in note 29).
33 19 USC § 2609 (2000).
34 Lawrence M. Kaye and Carla T. Main, The Saga of the Lydian Hoard: Ufak to New York and Back
Again, in Tubb, ed, Antiquities Trade or Betrayed 150 (cited in note 8).
35 Republic of Turky v OKS Partners, 797 F Supp 64 (D Mass 1992).
36 The agreements between Italy and the Metropolitan Museum of Art and between Italy and the
Boston Museum of Fine Arts implicitly recognize Italy's proper title to the antiquities that were
returned. For the Metropolitan Museum agreement, see Agreement between The Ministryfor Cultural
Heritage and Activities of the Italian Republic and the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York (copy on file
with author); for the Boston Museum of Fine Arts agreement, see An Agreement with the Italian
Ministry of Culture, available at <http://www.mfa.org/ collections/index.asp?key=2656> (visited
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B. THE PROBLEM PERSISTS
A recent study of the international antiquities market by S.M.R. Mackenzie
identifies reasons that existing legal restraints are less effective in this area than
in other criminal markets.37 White-collar criminals are heavily influenced by the
risk of detection and the likelihood and severity of punishment. It is estimated
that approximately 80 to 90 percent of the antiquities on the market lack
sufficient provenience38 to establish that they were discovered long enough ago
that their acquisition would not raise legal problems. With such a large
proportion of the antiquities on the international market lacking an adequate
documented history, two conclusions can be drawn. First, market participants
convince themselves that many of the market's undocumented antiquities are
chance finds and that this excuses sales that may be illegal.39 This rationalization
Apr 21, 2007). The fact that these museums agreed to return these artifacts suggests a recognition
by the parties that Italy could likely have recovered these artifacts in a legal action.
37 S.M.R. Mackenzie, Going Goin& Gone: Regulating the Market in Illicit Aniquilies (Inst of Art and Law
2005). In contrast to the limited remedies available under the US laws described in the preceding
section, Endangered Species Act, Pub L No 93-205, 81 Stat 884 (1972), codified at 16 USC 5
1531-44 (2000 & supp 2004), authorizes civil penalties (fines and forfeiture of all equipment,
including vessels, used in the violation of the statute), criminal penalties, and citizen suits to
ensure enforcement. 16 USC § 1540 (2000). This legal regime regulating trade in endangered
species is more stringent than that which addresses the trade in antiquities because of the wider
availability of criminal sanctions and because of stricter enforcement; it is therefore also regarded
as more effective. Mackenzie, Going Going Gone at 122-27 (cited in note 37). It is also more
stringent because it prohibits trade in artifacts that incorporate body parts of endangered species,
even though the artifacts were legally acquired before enactment of the legislation and is, in that
sense, retroactive in nature. Andrus v Allard, 444 US 51 (1979) (holding that the retroactive
application of the Eagle Protection Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act does not violate the
Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause).
38 Mackenzie, Going Goin& Gone at 32-50 (cited in note 37). One dealer interviewed by Mackenzie
put the number of artifacts that come to him with information of their archaeological origins at 1
percent. Id at 32. Stephen Dyson estimates that in 1990, 80 percent of the antiquities available for
sale on the market were illegally excavated and exported. Stephen L. Dyson, In Pursuit of Anient
Pasts: A Histoy of Classical Archaeology in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 225 (Yale 2006). The
term "provenience" is often used to indicate the history of an antiquity back to its archaeological
origin. The term "provenance" indicates the history of ownership of a work of art. If a
provenance for an antiquity is complete, then it satisfies the criteria of provenience. However,
most antiquities on the market have only a very incomplete ownership history. Coggins, 7 Intl J
Cultural Prop at 57 (cited in note 26); Mackenzie, Goin& Going Gone at 5-6 (cited in note 37).
39 Mackenzie, Goin& Going Gone at 32-38, 163-65 (cited in note 37). One collector went so far as to
classify any objects found by digging not carried out by an archaeologist as chance finds! Id at 56-57.
This rationalization-that unprovenanced antiquities are chance finds-ignores the fact that chance
finds are generally not in sufficiently good condition to make it into the international antiquities
market. True chance finds are found near the surface and will be fragmentary, scattered, and
weathered; objects that are of sufficiently high quality and condition to be collectible by a high-end
collector or museum are most likely found in tombs. Tubb and Brodie commented that "true chance
finds are difficult to come by .... Very few, if any, intact antiquities have been found [in twenty years
Vol 8 No. 1
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permits market participants to deny the causal connection between the funds
they put into the market and site looting. Second, because the government, in a
forfeiture or criminal prosecution, or the claimant in a civil suit bears the burden
of proving that a particular artifact is stolen, even those who trade in antiquities
that are the likely product of recent site looting often escape the reach of the
law.
Mackenzie's study demonstrates that market participants indulge in a
significant amount of denial about what they do. Many recognize that there are
looted and stolen artifacts and unethical dealers, but they all claim that they
themselves do not engage in any shady practices and that they conduct their
business in an ethical manner. Some buyers delude themselves into thinking that
they are legally protected by dealing only with those they know and trust and by
engaging in transparently ridiculous ruses. 4° Market participants excuse their
failure to research the backgrounds of the antiquities they acquire by saying they
want to protect the seller by not asking too many questions, they want to
maintain a competitive edge against other dealers, and they believe that lack of
complete provenience information does not necessarily mean that an artifact is
looted.4
While the potential for punishment may serve as a disincentive to the trade
in undocumented antiquities, certain aspects of the structure of the legal regime
restrain the full efficacy of the law. The most important restraint is that the
government or claimant bears the burden of proof to establish the required
elements. By definition, looted antiquities are undocumented before they appear
on the international market. As a result, the claimant or the government can
meet the legally required standard42 only in the unusual circumstance that the
of archaeological surface surveys]. The published material consists largely of pieces of broken pottery
and small architectural fragments. The idea that there are large quantities of antiquities lying about
waiting to be found is a myth." Kathryn Walker Tubb and Neil Brodie, From Museum to Manteoiece: The
Antiquities Trade in the United Kingdom, in Robert Layton, Peter G. Stone & Julian Thomas, eds,
Destruction and Conservation of Cultural Propery 102, 106 (Routledge 2001). In the UK, where the Portable
Antiquities Scheme requires the reporting of finds, only 9 percent of the finds reported in 2004-05
were found during construction, agricultural, and gardening activities and are therefore true chance
finds. See The Portable Antiquities Scheme Annual Report 2004-05, 88 and Table 8, available at
<http://www.finds.org.uk/documents/PAS-2004_05.pdf> (visited Apr 21, 2007).
40 Mackenzie, Goin, Going, Gone at 25-32 (cited in note 37).
41 Id at 47-60.
42 In a criminal prosecution, the government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the
artifact is stolen and that the current possessor knew or consciously avoided learning that the
artifact was stolen. See Schult , 333 F3d at 413-14 (discussing the government's burden in proving
a defendant's conscious avoidance). The plaintiff who seeks to recover stolen property must
establish by a preponderance of the evidence his or her right to own the property and that it was
stolen. See Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v Goldberg and Feldman Fine Arts, 917 F2d
278, 290-92 (7th Cir 1990). The standard of proof in a civil forfeiture action brought under Title
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artifact's time and place of discovery can be determined. The fact that so many
of the artifacts on the market are undocumented poses an additional challenge
for a prosecutor to establish that the possessor knew that this particular artifact
was looted.
Because of the difficulty in establishing the required elements for a criminal
prosecution, cases involving looted antiquities are more likely to be civil
forfeitures and private replevin claims.43 However, civil actions do not carry
sufficiently meaningful punishment because possessors of looted artifacts face
the possibility of losing only the artifacts' monetary value, and the amount of
money that market participants have at stake is relatively small. 44 A few examples
of the prices paid for antiquities at the source compared to their value in transit
and destination markets 45 illustrate the point that sellers of antiquities have little
financial investment in the antiquities they sell. While it is difficult to obtain first-
hand information as to the price of looted antiquities paid at the source, the
journalist Joanne Farchakh reported in May 2004 that at archaeological sites in
southern Iraq a cuneiform tablet would sell for four dollars, a decorated vase
would sell for between twenty and fifty dollars, and a sculpture would sell for
about one hundred dollars.46 In Baghdad, the journalist Joseph Braude paid two
hundred dollars for each of three cylinder seals looted from the Iraq Museum.
47
In comparison, cylinder seals sold on the market in London or New York have
19 (the Customs statute) is one of probable cause, Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 18 USC §
983 (2000). However, in civil forfeiture actions brought under other statutory provisions, the
government must prove its case to the usual civil standard of the preponderance of the evidence.
Stefan D. Cassella, Using the Forfeiture Laws to Protect Archaeological Resources, in Sherry Hutt, Marion
P. Forsyth, and David Tarler, eds, Presenting Archaeology in Court: Legal Strategies for Protecting Cultural
Resources 169, 183 (AltaMira 2006).
43 Mackenzie, Going Going Gone at 243-44 (cited in note 37).
44 Auction houses traditionally have none of their own funds at stake in an art market transaction
because they do not own the objects they sell; they merely act as agent for the owner. If a
purchaser is required to return an antiquity to its proper owner, then the purchaser or the auction
house recovers the purchase price from the seller. The auction house loses only its commission.
Dealers, on the other hand, typically own the works they sell and therefore have more of their
own funds at stake in a transaction, but because the mark-up on antiquities is so high, even
dealers lose relatively little if they must give up an antiquity.
45 For an explanation of transit and destination markets, see Morag M. Kersel, From the Ground to the
Buyer. A Market Analysis of the Trade in Illegal Antiquities, in Brodie, et al, eds, Archaeology, Cultural
Heritage, and the Antiquities Trade 188, 189-94 (cited in note 11).
46 Joanne Farchakh, Tmoignages d'une Archiologie Hiroi'ue, Archeologia 14,25 (May 2004).
47 US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Press Release, Cultural Antiquio Returned to Iraqi
Government after ICE Investigation (Jan 18, 2005), available online at <http://www.ice.gov/pi/
news/newsreleases/artides/iraqiarifact_011805.htm> (visited Apr 21, 2007). The seals stolen
from the Iraq Museum were of good but not top quality.
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an average value of one thousand dollars.48 A recent cursory survey of
comparable objects being offered on eBay showed that cylinder seals were
priced at $350 to $2,000; cuneiform tablets were offered at a range of $350 up to
£550 (approximately equivalent to $1027). 4' A recent Christie's catalogue gave
high and low estimates of $1200 and $1800 for a cuneiform envelope and tablet,
but it sold for $10,800.'o
These price differentials demonstrate that from the source at a looted
archaeological site (in southern Iraq), to the transit points (such as Baghdad), to
the ultimate market in locations such as New York and London, mark-ups for
antiquities can be a hundredfold or more. If a collector or dealer in London or
New York must relinquish an artifact, he or she loses relatively little out-of-
pocket. As Mackenzie points out," so long as the risks of detection and
meaningful punishment remain low, the conduct of those market participants
who violate the law will not be deterred. It is difficult, however, to craft a legal
system in which these impediments to meaningful punishment are eliminated.
III. SOLUTIONS
The problem that has been identified is the looting of archaeological
sites and the harm that this imposes through the loss of context and knowledge
of the past. Many mechanisms have been suggested for reducing the looting of
sites.5 2 However, within the scope of this Article, the only proposals that will be
48 Cylinder seals sold at an auction in London in May 2003 ranged from $400 to $4,000 with an
average of $1,000, while a seal auctioned by Christie's in 2001 sold for $424,000. See Neil Brodie,
The Plunder of Iraq's Archaeological Heritage 1991-2005 and the London Antiquities Trade, in Brodie, et
al, eds, Archaeology, Cultural Heritage, and the Antiquities Trade 206, 212 (cited in note 11); see
Suzanne Charle, Tiny Treasures Leave Big Void in Looted Iraq, NY Times E3 (July 18, 2003).
49 See, for example, <http://www.sandsoftimeantiquities.com> (visited Apr 21, 2007);
<http://www.arsantiqua-onine.com> (visited Apr 21, 2007); <http://www.artemission.com>
(visited Apr 21, 2007). This is not intended to indicate that these particular artifacts are recently
looted from Iraq; however, it demonstrates one market value that may be placed on artifacts.
50 See Christie's, New York Antiquities, Friday 16 June 2006 25 (2006); Christie's, Auction Result,
available online at <http://www.christies.com/auction/results/resultsotlist.asp?saleno=
NYC1679&page=l> (visited Apr 21, 2007). The provenance given in the catalogue for the tablet
and envelope went back to 1989. Iraq's antiquities law declaring national ownership dates to 1936;
any artifact removed after this date without consent of the Iraqi government is stolen property.
Article 3, Antiquities Law No 59 of 1936 and the two amendments, No 120 of 1974 and No 164
of 1975, available online at <http://developmentgateway.org/download/181160/Iraq-
Antiquities-Law.rtf> (visited Apr 21, 2007). The sale price includes the buyer's premium. See
<http://www.christies.com/auction/results/results-lotlist.asp?saleno=NYC1679&page=>
(visited Apr 21, 2007).
51 Mackenzie, Going, Going Gone at 243 (cited at note 37).
52 See, for example, Patrick J. O'Keefe, Trade in Antiquities: Reducing Destruction and Theft (Archetype
1997) (discussing increased education of the public in both archaeologically rich nations and
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examined are those that are premised on manipulation of market demand for
undocumented antiquities. Virtually all proposals involving the market focus on
the question of the extent to which the market in undocumented antiquities
should or should not be regulated. One approach focuses on decreasing
regulation of the market; other approaches focus on increasing regulation of the
market, through either direct or indirect means. Some of these representative
proposals will be analyzed.
A. DECREASING REGULATION OF THE MARKET
IN ANTIQUITIES
One group of proposals advocates for less regulation of the market in
antiquities. Some of the proposals advocating for less regulation do not seem to
regard the deterrence of all looting as a priority. 3 These proposals suggest that
the increased movement of ancient art works through the world that can be
achieved through a less regulated market is of greater value than what is learned
through controlled excavation 4 or they reject the connection between site
market nations, greater publicity, and greater financial assistance to nations to aid them in
guarding their sites).
53 There is admittedly a certain amount of contradiction in that everyone decries intentional looting
or looting of identified or official archaeological sites, but some distinguish this from other forms
of looting, although the basis for doing so is unclear. See, for example, John Boardman,
Archaeologists, Collectors, and Museums, in Eleanor Robson, Luke Treadwell, and Chris Gosden, eds,
Who Owns Objects? The Ethics and Politics of Collecting CulturalArtefacts 33, 35-41 (Oxbow 2006).
54 See, for example, the recent comments of John Boardman, Who Owns Antiquities?, Review of
Jonathan Tokeley, Rescuing the Past: The Cultural Heritage Crusade, available online at
<http://www.jonathantokeley.com/default> (visited Apr 21, 2007) (stating that "it is arguable
that as much or more progress in understanding our past has been made by study of objects,
excavated or not, than by excavation alone"); Randy Kennedy and Hugh Eakin, Met Chief,
Unbowed, Defends Museum's Role, NY Times El (Feb 28, 2006) (quoting Philippe de Montebello, the
director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, who stated, "the information that is lost [when an
object is looted] is a fraction of the information that an object can provide .... How much more
would you learn from knowing which particular hole in-supposedly Cerveteri-[the Euphronios
krater] came out of?... Everything is on the vase."). This approach can be identified with the
"cultural internationalist" view first propounded by John Henry Merryman. John Henry
Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property, 80 Am J Intl L 831 (1986). However, this
so-called "cultural internationalist" view of cultural property is not really internationalist and
should more appropriately be termed a free market approach. As Kersel wrote, "The term
internationalist conjures up positive connotations, providing access to all. Rather than being
internationalist in approach the free-market position, in this context, advocates for the unfettered
movement of cultural material in the marketplace-those who can afford to purchase the artifacts
are allowed access.... The international exchange of free-market proponents is primarily a flow
of objects from less-developed nations to collectors usually with a much higher per capita income.
And the exchange is usually financial, not intellectual." Kersel, License to Sell, at 5 n 13, 10-11
(citations omitted) (cited in note 12). These proposals also generally fail to recognize the harm
that the international market can do to individual objects to make them more appealing and more
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looting and market demand."5 While accepting that the country of origin has the
right to criminalize the looting of sites, these proposals reject the holding of the
McClain and SchultZ decisions-that antiquities taken in violation of a national
ownership law are stolen property in the destination countries, such as the US
and England. s6 If such objects are regarded as legal, rather than stolen, then the
number of legal objects available to be traded on the international market will
expand considerably.51
Those who reject the characterization of looted antiquities as stolen
property argue that criminalizing the trade in looted antiquities has created a
black market.5 8 If the trade in looted artifacts were no longer criminalized, then
the black market would largely disappear. This is, of course, correct, but it would
not deter the looting of sites-the true harm caused by the trade in
undocumented artifacts and the underlying detrimental conduct. If the looting of
sites and the trade in stolen artifacts were decriminalized, the result would be
more looting, not less, as there would no longer be any reason for restraint.
Without national ownership laws, buried antiquities would be regarded as having
no owner, or it would be impossible to prove who the true owner is. In a
variation on the paradigmatic "tragedy of the commons, ' 59 the first finder (that
saleable, in addition to the loss of context and knowledge. One may refer, as examples, to the
damage done to the Kanakaria mosaics by the dealer's resetting of the mosaic tiles, Catherine
Sease and Danae Thimme, The Kanakaria Mosaics: The Conservators' View, in Tubb, ed, Antiquities
Trade or Betrayed 122, 124-27 (cited in note 8), and the looting and recutting of Neo-Assyrian
reliefs to make them more attractive for the market, John Malcolm Russell, The Final Sack of
Nineveb 48 (Yale 1998). They also fail to recognize that it does not have to be a choice between
excavation and objects-when objects are properly excavated, the objects remain available to be
studied, curated, and displayed in museums.
55 James Cuno, the director of the Art Institute of Chicago, has written that, "when an antiquity is
offered to a museum for acquisition, the looting, f indeed there was any, has already occurred....
Museums are havens for objects that are already, and for whatever reason, alienated from their
original context. Museums do not alienate objects." James Cuno, View from the Universal Museumn, in
John H. Merryman, ed, Imperialism, Art and Reslitution 15, 29 (2006) (emphasis added). Cuno's use
of the passive voice and the doubt he attempts to cast on the question of whether an
undocumented artifact may be the product of looting indicate his denial of any link between a
museum's acquisitions (and the funds it puts into the market) and the looting. See also Mackenzie,
Going& Going, Gone at 142-45 (cited in note 37) (quoting from dealers' comments on the
relationship between looting and market demand).
56 John Henry Merryman, A Lidt International Trade in Cultural Objects, 4 Ind J Cultural Prop 13, 25-
30 (1995).
57 Id at 30 (stating that "by enlarging the number and variety of cultural objects that could be licidy
acquired, the suggested redefinition of a licit trade can divert trade from the black market and
reduce the material, social and economic harm it causes').
58 John Henry Merryman, Cultural Property Internaionalism, 12 Ind J Cultural Prop 11, 23 (2005).
59 In the classic problem of the "tragedy of the commons," overexploitation of a resource leads to
economic inefficiency. "In a commons, by definition, multiple owners are each endowed with the
privilege to use a given resource, and no one has the right to exclude another. When too many
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is, the looter) would be able to gain and transfer title to looted artifacts. Looters
would therefore have a greater incentive to take as much and as quickly as
possible. Decriminalization would encourage, rather than discourage, more
looting.
Other proposals that rely on decreased regulation of the market proffer
that by decreasing regulation and moving toward a managed but less strictly
regulated market in antiquities, demand for illegal objects will decrease and site
looting will be deterred.60 According to this argument, by providing a stream of
properly excavated and legitimately obtained artifacts, the legitimate market
would drive out the market for illegal and looted artifacts, 6 as buyers would
presumably prefer to buy legal, rather than illegal, objects. However, the
experiences of several countries with a managed market indicate that the
managed market system will not deter site looting because of several intractable
difficulties that the managed market poses. The difficulties that a managed
market raises include: from where would these legitimate objects come, whether
buyers will prefer these over looted objects, and whether the managed market
will be sufficiently regulated to prevent newly-looted objects and those that have
not been legitimately placed in the market from entering the legitimate market.
In a managed market, the legitimate artifacts would be those that are
properly excavated and documented, and, once this process is completed, those
that a country does not want to keep. Countries that are rich in archaeological
resources would sell off less important or "duplicate" artifacts that are presumed
to be stored in museums and storage depots.6 2 Yet many countries are unlikely
to sell off their antiquities and there is no realistic mechanism by which a
owners have such privileges of use, the resource is prone to overuse-a tragedy of the
commons." Michael A. Heller, The Traged of the Anicommons: Properly in the Transiion from Marx to
Markets, 111 Harv L Rev 621, 623-24 (1998). The solution to the problem of overexploitation is
the creation of private property rights, including rights to exclude others and rights based on
constructive possession. The analogy in the case of antiquities is the vesting of ownership of
antiquities in the nation, which can then regulate the "exploitation" of archaeological sites
through the awarding of excavation permits to those who are adequately trained in studying the
past so that the full potential (non-economic) benefit of the sites can be realized. Preservation of
sites can also bring sustainable economic benefits to the local population through archaeo-
tourism and other forms of exploitation that do not harm our ability to understand the past.
60 O'Keefe, Trade in Antiquiies at 66-69 (cited in note 52).
61 Merryman, 12 IntlJ Cultural Prop at 23 (cited in note 58).
62 Id. One of the difficulties with this proposal is determining which artifacts are unimportant,
"duplicates," or "redundant." Those favoring this proposal believe that countries and museums
should sell off those artifacts that are similar to each other or those that are of low market value.
Merryman, 4 Intl J Cultural Prop at 36-37 (cited in note 56); O'Keefe, Trade in Antiquities at 69-75
(cited in note 52).
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country can be forced to do so.63 While the market determines the significance
of an object by its monetary value, nations do not necessarily take this same
approach.64 Therefore, nations may not perceive that they have an "excess" of
antiquities to sell on the international market.6" Finally, there is some evidence
that there is an insufficient number of antiquities in storerooms to satisfy market
demand.66
Furthermore, a managed market is not likely to deter the looting of sites.
Looted artifacts fill a variety of market niches, ranging from the relatively low-
priced artifacts that are found in many similar forms to the high-priced
"museum quality" piece. Even if a nation were to place the low-end objects on
the market for sale, the desire of high-end collectors and some museums to
acquire the "museum quality" pieces would not be satisfied through permitted
sales.67 The looting of sites would therefore continue in the search to satisfy the
high-end demand, while artifacts of low economic value become the by-product
of the looting. In fact, the availability of large numbers of cheaper artifacts on
the market may encourage more people to enter the market and therefore
increase, rather than decrease, demand.68
Examples of several nations that currently permit some form of a legal
market or have done so in the past demonstrate that the looting of sites persists
despite the availability of legally obtained artifacts on the market. Israel permits
the legal sale of artifacts found on private land before enactment of its national
ownership law in 1978 so long as the artifacts have been registered. 69 However,
63 It is not for members of the market community to force a market-based solution on other
countries. It is an inherent attribute of sovereignty for a nation to determine where to draw the
line between public and private property and to determine how it wishes to conserve or dispose
of its resources. For a general discussion, see Joseph W. Singer, Sovereigny and Propery, 86 Nw U L
Rev 1, 41-42, 47 (1991).
(A Tubb and Brodie, From Museum to Manteopiece at 108 (cited in note 39).
65 O'Keefe points out that no one knows whether there are "excess" artifacts in museum storage
and that there are reasons for keeping artifacts from a single site together since they serve as an
archive from which further research can be conducted. O'Keefe, Trade in Antiquities at 71, 73
(cited in note 52). He also states that if museums are to be required to sell off objects in storage,
then this principle should be applied equally to museums in all countries and not in a
discriminatory manner that distinguishes between collections in the archaeologically rich nations
and those in the market nations. Id at 73.
66 Kersel, License to Sell at 13 (cited at note 12) (stating that studies indicate that the sale of artifacts
from the storerooms of the Israel Antiquities Authority would deplete the storerooms in less than
a year).
67 Id (stating that high-end collectors and museum are not interested in acquiring duplicate or
surplus objects); O'Keefe, Trade in Aniquities at 69 (cited in note 52).
68 O'Keefe, Trade in Antiquities at 68 (cited in note 52).
69 Kersel, License to Sell at 88-94 (cited in note 12).
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because merchants swap registration numbers and exploit other loopholes in the
law, many of the artifacts sold on the market do not come from the legal stock;7"
rather, the looting continues because a fresh stream of looted artifacts can enter
the legitimate market.7 ' There is even evidence of looting to obtain specific
artifacts to satisfy market demand.72 Cyprus has allowed the export of antiquities
in the past, yet the looting of sites was not deterred. 73 The US permits a legal
trade in antiquities found on private land,74 but again sites in the US are still
looted.75 Canada and England permit private ownership and sale of antiquities
found on private land and their markets are controlled only through an export
licensing system.76 Yet the presence of a managed market in privately owned and
legally obtained artifacts does not seem to satisfy market demand and thereby
deter the looting of archaeological sites.77 The inescapable conclusion is that site
looting is not deterred through a solution that encourages, rather than
discourages, the market. Proposals that advocate less regulation of the market
70 Id at 162-67.
71 Id at 55-58.
72 Id at 184-86.
73 Ellen Herscher, Destroying the Past in Order to "Save" It: Collecting Antiquities from Cyprus, in Neil
Asher Silberman and Ernest S. Frerichs, eds, Archaeology and Sodety in the 21st Centuy: The Dead Sea
Scrolls and Other Case Studies 138, 146 (Israel Expl Soc 2001) (stating that "there is no indication
that the availability of antiquities for legal export nor the opportunity for museums to obtain a
share of the finds by licensed archaeological excavations had any impact on deterring rampant
looting throughout the island").
74 The Archaeological Resources Protection Act applies only to sites located on federally owned or
controlled land. 16 USC § 470cc(a) (2000) (restricting excavation and removal of archaeological
resources found on federal or Indian lands). State statutes that are similar to ARPA apply only to
state-owned land. Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Propery: The Protection of Cultural Propery in
the United States, 75 BU L Rev 559, 596-601 (1995) (citing state statutes). Approximately half of
the states have laws that apply to burials found on private land, but burials on private land in the
other states and settlement sites on private land are generally not protected by statute. For a list of
state statutes applying to burials on private land, see Patty Gerstenblith, Protection of Cultural
Heritage Found on Private Land: The Paradigm of the Miami Circle and Regulatory Takings Doctrine after
Lucas, 13 St Thomas L Rev 65, 101-03 (2000).
75 Veletta Canouts and Francis P. McManamon, Protecting the Past for the Future: Federal Archaeology in
the United States, in Brodie, Doole, and Renfrew, eds, Trade in Illicit Antiquities 97, 100-02 (cited in
note 12).
76 For the Canadian export licensing system, see the Canada Cultural Property Export and Import
Act, RSC 1985, c C-51, § 37. For a description of the British export licensing system, see Sara E.
Bush, The Protection of British Heritage. Woburn Abby and the Three Graces, 5 Ind J Cultural Prop 269,
277-81 (1996).
77 See, for example, the case of the Icklingham bronzes looted from a scheduled archaeological site
in England and acquired by New York collectors Shelby White and Leon Levy. John Browning, A
Layman's Attempts to Precipitate Change in Domestic and International -Ieritage' Laws, in Tubb, ed,
Antiquities Trade or Betrayed 145 (cited in note 8).
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provide a veneer of respectability that encourages trading in artifacts that are
likely to be the product of contemporary site looting.
B. INCREASING REGULATION OF THE MARKET
IN ANTIQUITIES
The alternative to a less regulated market is a more regulated market with
the goal of decreasing demand for undocumented antiquities. There are several
ways in which more regulation can be achieved. Direct regulation relies on
methods by which the government imposes direct consequences on market
participants. Market participants can achieve regulation through voluntary self-
regulation. Indirect regulation is accomplished through the granting or denial of
government benefits that are aimed at encouraging individuals and institutions
to avoid acquiring undocumented artifacts.
1. Increasing Direct Regulation of the Market in Antiquities
There are several means by which direct regulation of the market in
antiquities could be increased. As Mackenzie has pointed out, for the deterrent
effect of the legal regime to be most effective, the risk of detection and the
certainty and severity of punishment must be high."8 The most obvious way to
increase direct regulation would be to reverse the burden of proof so that the
current possessor of an antiquity would carry the burden of proving the
legitimate origin of the antiquity in civil forfeiture actions, private replevin
claims, and criminal prosecutions. In June 2003, in fulfillment of its obligations
under UN Security Council Resolution 1483, the UK adopted Statutory
Instrument 2003 No 1519, which reverses the burden of proof in a criminal
prosecution of individuals dealing in Iraqi cultural property illegally removed
after August 6, 1990."9 There is evidence from market statistics that this criminal
provision is depressing the London market in Mesopotamian cylinder seals.80
78 As Mackenzie states, "Just as justice must not only be done but be seen to be done, so antiquities
must not only be licitly excavated and traded, but must be seen to be licitly excavated and traded."
Mackenzie, Going Going Gone at 21 (cited in note 37).
79 Iraq (United Nations Sanctions) Order, Statutory Instrument 2003 No 1519, available at
<http://www.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2003/20031519.htm> (visited Apr 21, 2007). Section 8 (3)
states, "Any person who deals in any item of illegally removed cultural property [from Iraq] shall
be guilt, of an offence.., unless he proves that he did not know and had no reason to suppose
that the items in question was illegally removed Iraqi cultural property." See also Kevin
Chamberlain, The Iraq (United Nations Sanctions) Order 2003-Is It Human Rights Co afible?, 8 Art,
Antiquity and Law 357, 361-68 (2003) (discussing whether this reversal of the burden of proof is
compatible with European human rights law and concluding that it is).
80 Brodie, The Plunder of Iraq's Archaeological Heritage at 217-18 (cited in note 48). The vast majority of
Mesopotamian cylinder seals come from Iraq. Id at 215.
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However, such a reversal of the burden of proof, particularly in criminal cases,
would likely be unconstitutional in the US.
Another method of increasing direct regulation is to broaden the
availability of criminal prosecution and increase the severity of punishment for
those who have been convicted. One way of broadening the availability of
criminal prosecution would be to make the knowing, intended, or attempted
import of cultural materials in violation of an import restriction enacted
pursuant to the CPIA a criminal violation.81 The possibility of criminal
prosecution, rather than simple civil forfeiture, should have a greater deterrent
effect.
The Cultural Heritage Resource Crimes Sentencing Guideline ("Sentencing
Guideline"), promulgated in 2002, significantly increases the criminal penalties
available for those who have been convicted of a broad range of cultural heritage
resource crimes, including trading in stolen antiquities.8 2 In particular, the
Sentencing Guideline has, as one of its goals, reducing reliance on market value
to determine the severity of a sentence and focusing reliance, instead, on the
harm done to the historical and archaeological record.83 However, it is clear that
this new guideline is not yet adequately understood by federal prosecutors and
federal judges, as demonstrated by the way in which the author Joseph Braude,
who smuggled into the US three cylinder seals stolen from the Iraq Museum in
Baghdad in 2003, was charged, and the light sentence he was given. 84
81 St. Hilaire has argued that a knowing violation of a CPIA import restriction would constitute a
criminal violation under 18 USC § 545, which states: "Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports
or brings into the United States, any merchandise contrary to law, or receives, conceals, buys,
sells, or in any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of such merchandise
after importation, knowing the same to have been imported or brought into the United States
contrary to law [shall be subject to criminal penalties]." St. Hilaire, International Antiquities
Trafficking at 4 (cited in note 21).
82 18 USC Appx § 2B1.5 (2000).
83 The US Sentencing Commission said, among the reasons for the new guidelines, that "[b]ecause
individuals, communities, and nations identify themselves through intellectual, emotional, and
spiritual connections to places and objects, the effects of cultural heritage resource crimes
transcend mere monetary considerations. Accordingly, this new guideline takes into account the
transcendent and irreplaceable value of cultural heritage resources and punishes in a proportionate
way the aggravating conduct associated with cultural heritage resource crimes." Reason for
Amendment, 18 USC Appx § 2B1.5. See Paula J. Desio, Crimes and Punishment: Developing Sentendng
Guidelines for Cultural Heritage Resource Crimes, in Jennifer R. Richman and Marion P. Forsyth, eds,
Legal Perrpectives on Cultural Resources 61 (AltaMira 2004). The US Supreme Court's decision in
United States v Booker, 543 US 220 (2005), has rendered the status of all sentencing guidelines
uncertain.
84 Braude was not even charged with violations of the National Stolen Property Act, despite the fact
that the cylinder seals still had their Iraq Museum registration numbers partially visible. He was
charged only with three counts of smuggling and making false statements in violation of 18 USC §
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Mackenzie has proposed a radical shift in the way in which the criminal law
could operate to deter trafficking in recently looted archaeological materials by
instituting clearer legal prohibition with the consequence of higher risk of
criminal conviction and more severe punishment. The essence of Mackenzie's
proposal is that nations should adopt a legal rubric based on the registration of
all antiquities that are currently held in collections (whether museums, private
collections, or dealer and auction house inventory).85 All antiquities currently in
collections could be freely registered and this would, admittedly, launder title to
these objects, regardless of whether they were obtained legitimately or not.86
However, for any antiquity to be registered after this system was enacted, the
owner would have to demonstrate clear legitimate title and excavation history.87
Trading in any unregistered antiquities would be a criminal offense.
The trade-off of legitimating antiquities currently in collections might be
worthwhile, if we could thereby assure that all antiquities looted in the future
would become unmarketable and the legal consequences to those who trade in
such antiquities would be sure, swift, and severe. However, before such a system
could be seriously considered, we must recognize the difficulties in creating a
foolproof registration system. Can antiquities (other than major pieces) be
sufficiently identified in a registry so that recently looted artifacts could not be
switched for others that were previously known and registered? Could we assure,
even with modern technology, that no new artifacts would enter the legitimate
market? It is not likely that this system would be workable and foolproof.
Kersel's study of the registration system of antiquities in Israel demonstrates the
difficulties in enforcing such a system.88 It requires the devotion of government
and law enforcement resources as well as the voluntary cooperation of dealers-
elements that are clearly not present in the Israeli system. It also requires the
technological ability to uniquely identify each artifact. There is no reason at this
time to believe that a registration system would be reliably administered and
enforced, technologically feasible, and cost effective.
2. Increasing Regulation through Voluntary Self-Regulation
Controlling the market through voluntary self-regulation is another way of
reducing demand for looted antiquities. While some scholars participate in the
545. Braude was sentenced to six months of house arrest and two years of probation. See US
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Press Release (cited in note 47).
85 Mackenzie, Goin Going, Gone at 237-46 (cited in note 37).
86 Id at 240.
87 Id.
88 Kersel, License to Sell at 162-67 (cited in note 12).
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trade by authenticating undocumented artifacts89 and by collecting, professional
organizations, such as the Archaeological Institute of America ("AIA") and the
Society for American Archaeology ("SAA"), have codes of ethics that prohibit
activities by their members that enhance the value of undocumented artifacts,
including prohibitions on direct involvement in the trade, authentication, and
appraisal of artifacts,9 ° and the publication or presentation at their scholarly
meetings of undocumented artifacts.9
Dealers' associations have adopted codes of ethics that regulate the
conduct of their membership. 92 However, the codes of dealers' associations
rarely address the specifics of the trade in antiquities or are ambiguous in doing
so.93 Only the Code of Practice for the Conf~dration Internationale des
N6gociants en Oeuvres d'Art specifies that members should not trade in "an
imported object that was acquired dishonestly or illegally from an official
excavation site or monuments or originated from an illegal, clandestine or
89 Brodie, The Plunder of Iraq's Archaeological Heritage at 217-18 (cited in note 48).
90 The AIA's Code of Ethics states that "members of the AIA should: ... [r]efuse to participate in
the trade in undocumented antiquities and refrain from activities that enhance the value of such
objects." The Code applies to both lay and professional members of the Institute. A!A Code of
Ethics, available online at <http://www.archaeological.org/pdfs/AIA Code of EthicsA5S.pdf>
(visited Apr 21, 2007). The SAA's Principles of Archaeological Ethics states, "Whenever possible
[archaeologists] should discourage, and should themselves avoid, activities that enhance the
commercial value of archaeological objects ...." SAA, Prindples of Archeological Ethics, available
online at <http://www.saa.org/aboutSAA/committees/ethics/principles.html> (visited Apr 21,
2007).
91 The AIA's Code of Ethics defines "undocumented antiquities" as "those which are not
documented as belonging to a public or private collection before December 30, 1970, the date
when the AIA Council endorsed the 1970 UNESCO Convention, or which have not been
excavated and exported from the country of origin in accordance with the laws of that country."
AIA Code of Ethics (cited in note 90). The AIA's policy for its publications states that they "will
not serve for the announcement or initial scholarly presentation of any object in a private or
public collection acquired after December 30, 1973, unless its existence is documented before that
date, or it was legally exported from the country of origin." AIA, Publications Poliffor the AJA and
Archaeology, available online at <http://www.archaeological.org/webinfo.php?page=10040>
(visited Apr 21, 2007). A similar policy pertains to papers presented at the AIA's Annual Meeting;
see, for example, AIA, Open Session Submission Form, available online at <http://
www.archaeological.org/formmaker.php?page=101 78> (visited Apr 21, 2007).
92 Merryman, 12 Intl J Cultural Prop at 27 (cited in note 58); O'Keefe, Trade in Aniquiies at 47-51
(cited in note 52).
93 Brodie notes that Article 2 of both the Antiquities Dealers Association's Code of Ethics and the
Code of Ethics of the International Association of Dealers in Ancient Art say that their members
should not trade in antiquities stolen from excavations. However, Brodie interprets the use of the
phrase "stolen antiquities" as referring only to antiquities looted from known or designated
archaeological sites or from private land. Brodie, The Plunder of Iraq's Archaeological Heritage at 218-
19 (cited in note 48).
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otherwise unofficial site."9 4 In 1999, UNESCO promulgated an International
Code of Ethics for Dealers in Cultural Property, which states in Article 1 that
"[p]rofessional traders in cultural property will not import, export or transfer the
ownership of this property when they have reasonable cause to believe it has
been stolen, illegally alienated, clandestinely excavated or illegally exported.""
While some but not all of these codes address the particular problems of the
trade in undocumented antiquities, there is little evidence that these codes are
internally enforced, and therefore they seem to have little impact on the actual
conduct of the trade.
96
Individual museums and the museum organizations have policies that
regulate their acquisitions. The Code of Ethics for Museums of the International
Council of Museums ("ICOM") requires that acquisitions be in full compliance
with the laws of the country of origin of artifacts, transit countries, and the
country where the museum is located.9" On the other hand, the two major
American museum associations do not take as clear a position. The Code of
Ethics of the American Association of Museums says little about the particular
problems of the acquisition of antiquities," while the Association of Art
Museum Directors' guidelines, adopted in June 2004, on the acquisition of
ancient art and antiquities have numerous loopholes.99 In contrast, several
94 Code of Practice for the Control of International Trading in Works of Art, reprinted in 7 Intl J
Cultural Prop 203 (1998).
95 International Code of Ethics for Dealers in Cultural Property, available online at
<http://www.unesco.org/culture/legalprotection/comrnittee/htm-eng/ethicsl.shtml> (visited
Apr 21, 2007).
96 O'Keefe, Trade in Antiquities at 50-51 (cited in note 52). The UNESCO Code refers to
professional traders and therefore includes both dealers and auction houses. There does not seem
to be any other code of conduct that includes auction houses, but both Christie's and Sotheby's
maintain their own internal rules of compliance. However, other than references to these
compliance rules, the rules themselves are not publicly available. There is only one association of
private collectors, and it has no code of conduct. Id at 44.
97 ICOM, Code of Ethics for Museums, 2006, art 2.3, available online at <http://icom.museum/
code2006_eng.pdf> (visited Apr 21, 2007).
98 The Code states: "acquisition, disposal, and loan activities are conducted in a manner that respects
the protection and preservation of natural and cultural resources and discourages illicit trade in
such materials." American Association of Museums, Code of Ethics for Museums, available online at
<http://www.aam-us.org/museumresources/ethics/coe.cfm> (visited Apr 21, 2007).
99 Association of Art Museum Directors, Report of the AAMD Task Force on the Acquisition of
Archaeological Materials and Ancient Art, available online at <http://www.mta-hq.org/pdf/
Assem06_AAMDHdt.pdf> (visited Apr 21, 2007). For more detailed analysis of the AAMD
guidelines, see Patty Gerstenblith, Collecting Antiquities in the International Market: Philosophy, Law and
Heritage, in Sherry Hutt, ed, Yearbook of Cultural Proper y Law 2007 (Left Coast forthcoming 2007).
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individual museums, such as the Field Museum of Natural History in Chicago'00
and, more recently, the Getty Museum' and the Indianapolis Museum of
Art, 2 have adopted policies that prohibit the acquisition of antiquities that are
not documented before 1970 or that do not have an export license from the
country of origin. Such policies assure that these museums will not be
contributing, either directly or indirectly, to the funding of the contemporary
looting of sites. However, most actively acquiring art museums do not make
their acquisitions policies public and so it is not possible to determine what
standards they follow.
While codes of ethics and practice could be a useful source of restraint on
the market in undocumented antiquities, these codes seem not to be numerous,
are often vague or ambiguous in referring to the particular problems of looted
artifacts, and are often not enforced within the association. Without some
external inducement to encourage the promulgation of codes that address the
problems of undocumented antiquities, transparency of the codes' provisions,
and adherence to them, it is difficult to assess their efficacy. To the extent that
market participants are private individuals or corporations, it is also difficult to
imagine what would provide this inducement other than greater direct regulation
of the market.
3. Increasing Indirect Regulation of the Market in Antiquities
While most of the participants in the market are private actors (dealers,
auction houses, and private collectors), museums are public institutions and they
receive a significant amount of financial subsidy from federal, state, and local
governments. They are therefore susceptible to various forms of indirect
governmental regulation. 1 3 Most museums in the US are incorporated as
100 The Field Museum's policy on accessions states that "the museum and staff 'shall be in full
compliance with laws and regulations, both domestic and foreign, governing transfer of
ownership and movement of materials across political boundaries."' Willard L. Boyd, Museums as
Centers of Cultural Understanding, in Merryman, ed, Imperiasm, Art and Restitution 47, 50 (cited in note
55).
101 See The J. Paul Getty Trust, Polig Statement, Acquisitions b) theJ. Paul Gety Museum, available online
at <http://www.getty.edu/about/governance/pdfs/acquisitions-policy.pdf> (visited Apr 21,
2007).
102 See Press Release, LMA Declares Moratorium on Acquisition of Archaeological Objects Lacking Adequate
Provenance, available online at <http://www.ima-art.org/pressrelease.asp?sectionid=174> (visited
Apr 21, 2007).
103 The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act requires museums that receive
federal funding to create inventories and summaries of Native American cultural items in their
collections and to make these available for restitution to lineal descendants and culturally affiliated
tribes under various circumstances. 25 USC § 3001(8) (2000) (defining "museum" as "any
institution or State or local government agency... that receives Federal funds. . . ."). These
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charitable organizations and receive their favored tax-exempt status under
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code on the basis that they serve an
educational or scientific purpose1CN They therefore have a legal obligation to
make this scientific or educational purpose paramount in their practices and
functions and must give priority to the preservation of the cultural and historical
record. American museums, as educational institutions, have a particular role to
play in diminishing the demand for undocumented artifacts. Museums violate
their educational or scientific purpose when they contribute, even if indirectly, to
the looting of archaeological sites and the destruction of knowledge.
Museums in the US are, in many senses, the collectors of last resort due to
both their highly visible leadership role among museums throughout the world
and the US tax structure that encourages donations of art works, thereby
reducing the cost of antiquities to the American purchaser."" However, if a
museum accepts as a gift or bequest artifacts to which the museum is not
receiving title, then the museum is receiving nothing of value and the American
public is subsidizing the trade in undocumented artifacts. The IRS should be
taking into consideration the certainty of title in determining whether to permit a
collector to take a deduction for a gift of antiquities so as to eliminate this
additional subsidy to the acquisition of undocumented antiquities. 1 6 In
determining certainty of title, the burden of proving the artifact's legitimate
requirements could not have been directly imposed but were imposed in exchange for the benefit
of federal funding.
104 Section 501(c)(3) defines those organizations that qualify as charitable organizations as
"corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively
for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes." 26
USC § 501(c)(3). Charitable organizations are exempt from the payment of taxes on any profits
they earn, like other nonprofit organizations, but donations made to a § 501 (c)(3) organization are
eligible as deductions from the income of the donor (both individuals and corporations) under §
170, subject to certain limitations and so long as the organization is not classified as a private
foundation. Section 642(c) allows a comparable deduction from the income of an estate or trust
and section 2055 gives a similar deduction in the valuation of an estate for estate tax purposes.
For a general discussion, see Patty Gerstenblith, Acquisition and Deacquisiion of Museum Collections
and the Fiduciay Obligations of Museums to the Public, 11 Cardozo J Intl & Comp L 409, 413 (2003).
105 Shelby White, the owner of one of the largest private collections of antiquities in the US, wrote
that the extent of public subsidy when art works are donated to museums from larger estates is
approximately one-fourth of the art's fair market value. Shelby White, Building American Museums:
The Role of the Private Collector, in Kate Fitz Gibbon, ed, Who Owns the Past? Cultural Poliy, Cultural
Property, and the Law 165, 174 (Rutgers 2005).
106 When a donor donates art that is valued at more than $5,000, an appraisal must be obtained; if the
artwork is worth more than $20,000, then the appraisal must be filed with the tax return. See IRS,
Instructions for Form 8283, available online at <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i8283.pdf>
(visited Apr 21, 2007). In such cases, the IRS Art Advisory Panel reviews the valuation. However,
the Panel considers only fair market value of the work and not the question of whether the
museum is receiving good title. For a similar proposal, see Atwood, Stealing History at 245-46
(cited in note 12).
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background should be placed on the donor. If a collector knows that he or she
may not be able ultimately to donate an antiquity to a museum because the
artifact's legitimate background cannot be affirmatively established, then the
collector is more likely to avoid purchasing the undocumented artifact. This
could have a significant impact on the prices that American collectors are willing
to pay for undocumented antiquities and this should, in turn, discourage the
market for such antiquities.
The state attorney general could also take a more active role in enforcing
museum trustees' fiduciary obligations. When a museum purchases antiquities of
undocumented background and the museum later returns them to the proper
owner, this constitutes waste of the museum's assets and a violation of the
fiduciary obligation of care.107 The large numbers of artifacts returned to Italy
and Greece in the past year alone by the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the
Boston Museum of Fine Arts, and the Getty all represent, to the extent that
these objects were purchased, funds that were wasted. The state attorney general
should hold the museums' trustees responsible for such breaches of their
obligations and impose personal liability for the waste of museum assets.
Museums also receive a considerable amount of direct funding from
federal, state, and local governments, such as grants and funds for their
operating budgets, and they often receive indirect subsidies such as free or below
market leases on the land on which they are located.'0 8 In exchange for these
subsidies, museums could be required to make public their acquisitions policies
and their acquisitions with their ownership history.0 9 In this way, the public
would be able to determine how the museums are conducting themselves and
whether they are acquiring undocumented antiquities. Indirect regulation of
museums holds significant potential for reducing the demand for undocumented
antiquities and thereby helping to diminish the looting of archaeological sites.
IV. CONCLUSION
The buying of undocumented antiquities that are the likely product of
contemporary looting of archaeological sites contributes significantly to the
destruction of our cultural heritage, a nonrenewable, finite resource, by
providing a financial incentive for this looting. The destruction of sites imposes
a harm on society and should be curtailed through a combination of efforts
107 On the fiduciary duty of care of museum trustees, see Gordon H. Marsh, Governance of Non-Profit
Ogzani{ations: An Appropriate Standard of Conductfor Trustees and Directors of Museums and Other Cultural
Insitutions, 85 Dickinson L Rev 607, 610-11 (1980-81).
108 See Gerstenblith, 11 Cardozo J Intl L & Comp L at 415-16 (cited in note 104).
109 The new Getty policy on acquisitions states that information concerning acquisitions will be made
available to the public. Acquisitions by tbeJ. Paul Gety Museum 6 (cited in note 101).
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encompassing more vigorous enforcement of the laws that currently exist, more
flexible approaches to the international and national legal regimes, indirect
regulation of museum acquiring practices through compliance and transparency
requirements for acquisitions in exchange for receipt of financial benefits from
federal, state, and local governments, increased supervision of museum boards
of trustees, and curtailment of the tax deduction available to donors of
undocumented ancient works of art and antiquities. Increased regulation of the
market should be realized through a combination of expansion of legal rules and
law enforcement, greater observance of codes of practice with more precise
prohibitions on participation in the trade in undocumented antiquities, and more
regulation of American museums. These solutions are premised on the
recognition that a loosely regulated market is a major contributor to the problem
of site looting and not the source of a solution. While there has been
considerable progress over the past twenty-five years, more progress is needed if
our heritage will be preserved and future generations will be able to continue to
enjoy and learn from the past.
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